Pairing-Based Batch Arguments for NP with a Linear-Size CRS

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Batch Arguments for NP

Boolean circuit satisfiability

$$\mathcal{L}_C = \{x \in \{0,1\}^n : \exists w, C(x, w) = 1\}$$

Prover



$$(x_1,\ldots,x_\ell)$$

Goal: convince verifier that $x_i \in \mathcal{L}_C$ for all $i \in [\ell]$

Verifier



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<u>Proof size</u>: Sublinear in ℓ , i.e., $|\pi| = |C| \cdot \text{poly}(\log \ell, \lambda)$

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Similar for verifier time (beyond reading statements)

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Different Paths towards BARGs



- iO or knowledge assumptions
- Or rely on the Random Oracle Model

Correlation Intractability:



[C]]'2 la, C]]'2 lb...]

CI-hash is a heavy machinery

Different Paths towards BARGs

SNARGs:



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Correlation Intractability:




CI-hash is a heavy machinery

[CJJ'21a, CJJ'21b...]



[WW'22...]



No heavy tool + Black box crypto

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<u>Correlation</u> <u>Intractability:</u>

A.

CI-hash is a heavy machinery

[CJJ'21a, CJJ'21b...]



- Standard assumptions

Pairing-Based
[WW'22...]

No heavy tool + Black box crypto

Quadratic CRS and prover-time : (

Scalability Challenge

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Pairing-Based:

[WW'22...]

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Pairing-Based:

[WW'22...]

- Standard assumptions
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Example Parameters:

- CRS for $\ell = 10^5$: $> 10^8$ group elements
- Recursion? [ww'22]: Non-black-box crypto + Impractical

Q: Pairing-based BARG with linearsize CRS & quasi-linear prover time?

Our Results

A New Pairing-based BARG for NP

- CRS size: Linear in the # of instances ℓ
- Prover time: $\approx \widetilde{O}_{\lambda}(|C| \cdot \ell)$
- Based on a q-type assumption

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Hybrid of BDH Exponent [BBG'05] + Subgroup Decision Assumption [BGN'05]


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
Hybrid of BDH Exponent [BBG'05] + Subgroup Decision Assumption [BGN'05]

Proven secure in the GGM



Vector of labels for wire i across ℓ instances

$$\mathbf{w}_i = (w_{i,1}, w_{i,2}, ..., w_{i,\ell})$$




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$$\sigma_i$$
 s.t. $|\sigma_i| = \text{poly}(\lambda)$



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
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Wire validity



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
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


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Validity proofs

Gate validity



$$\mathbf{w}_i = (w_{i,1}, w_{i,2}, \dots, w_{i,\ell})$$
Pedersen comm


$$\sigma_i$$
 s.t. $|\sigma_i| = \text{poly}(\lambda)$



Output validity

Commit-and-Prove for BARG

[Waters, Wu, Crypto'22]



$$\mathbf{w}_{i} = (w_{i,1}, w_{i,2}, \dots, w_{i,\ell})$$

Pedersen comm

$$\sigma_i$$
 s.t. $|\sigma_i| = \text{poly}(\lambda)$

Validity proofs

Output validity

BARG proof: $\{\sigma_i\}$ + validity proofs

Q: How to compute validity proofs?

Let's focus on wire validity proofs

G: Group of order N = pq

 \mathbb{G}_p : Subgroup of order p w/ generator g_p

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$$g_p^{\alpha_\ell} \in \mathbb{G}_p$$

Commit $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, ..., x_\ell) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$:

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Commit $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, ..., x_\ell) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$:

$$\sigma_{\mathcal{X}} = x_1[\alpha_1] + x_2[\alpha_2] + \dots + x_{\ell}[\alpha_{\ell}]$$

$$\sigma_{x} = x_1[\alpha_1] + x_2[\alpha_2] + \dots + x_{\ell}[\alpha_{\ell}]$$

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$$(x_1[\alpha_1] + \dots + x_{\ell}[\alpha_{\ell}])^2$$

$$= (x_1[\alpha_1] + \dots + x_{\ell}[\alpha_{\ell}]) \cdot [\alpha_1 + \dots + \alpha_{\ell}]$$

$$-(\sum_{i \neq j} (x_i - x_i x_j) [\alpha_i \alpha_j])$$
 Cross terms

$$\sigma_{x} = x_1[\alpha_1] + x_2[\alpha_2] + \dots + x_{\ell}[\alpha_{\ell}]$$

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$$(x_1[\alpha_1] + \dots + x_\ell[\alpha_\ell])^2 \quad \text{"Multiplication" = Pairing}$$

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$$\text{Validity proof}$$

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Validity proof

Caveat: ℓ^2 -size CRS includes $\{ [\alpha_i \alpha_j] \}_{i \neq j}$

Q: Check quadratic equations without cross-terms?

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Idea: Vector commitment



Polynomial commitment

Quadratic Check using Polynomials

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Interpolate
$$\phi(x)$$
 s.t. $\phi(i) = w_i$ for all $i \in [\ell]$

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$$\phi(x) \text{ s.t.}$$

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 Commit
$$\sigma_w = [\phi(\alpha)]$$

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w $\phi(x) \text{ s.t.}$ $\phi(i) = w_i \text{ for all } i \in [\ell]$

Compute from CRS and coefficients of ϕ

$$\sigma_{\mathbf{w}} = [\phi(\alpha)]$$

Commit

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- $Z_{\ell}(x) = \prod_{i \in [\ell]} (x i)$ Q(x): quotient polynomial

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Q(x): quotient polynomial

"Multiplication" = Pairing

Validity proof

Commitment:
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Interpolation set

- Linear CRS size = Roots-of-unity
- $O(\ell \log \ell) \mathbb{Z}_N$ -ops + $O(\ell)$ G-ops

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$$\phi^2 - \phi = Z_{\ell}(x) \cdot Q(x)$$

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Q(x): quotient polynomial



$$[\phi(\alpha)] \cdot [\phi(\alpha)] - [\phi(\alpha)] \cdot [1] = [Z_{\ell}(\alpha)] \cdot [Q(\alpha)]$$

"Multiplication" = Pairing

Validity proof

Q: How about other validity proofs?

Similar approach, as relations are quadratic

Comparison with [KZG'I0]

[KZG'10]:

- Knowledge soundness
- Knowledge assumptions or AGM

Our result:

- Somewhere extractability
- Security in the standard model
- Falsifiable assumption

Comparison with [KZG'I0]


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
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
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
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







Somewhere Extraction:

Trapdoor CRS Generation: Normal td* Circuit C Somewhere Extraction:





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: $g_p^{\alpha^{\ell}} g_q^{i^{*\ell}}$

$$CRS^* = [1] \cdot [1], [\alpha] \cdot [i^*], ..., [\alpha^{\ell}] \cdot [i^{*\ell}]$$

$$|d^*| = g_q \in \mathbb{G}_q$$

 $\begin{array}{l} \underline{\text{Trapdoor CRS Generation:}} \quad i^* \in [\ell]: \boxed{g_p^{\alpha^\ell} g_q^{i^*\ell}} \\ \\ \text{CRS}^* = [1] \cdot [1], [\alpha] \cdot [i^*], \dots, [\alpha^\ell] \cdot [i^{*\ell}] \\ \\ \approx_c \\ \\ \text{CRS} = [1], \qquad [\alpha] \quad , \dots, [\alpha^\ell] \end{array}$

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 $\begin{array}{ll} \underline{\text{Trapdoor CRS Generation:}} & i^* \in [\ell]: \boxed{g_p^{\alpha^\ell} g_q^{i^*\ell}} & \underline{\text{True in GGM}} \\ \\ \underline{\text{CRS}^*} &= [1] \cdot [1], [\alpha] \cdot [i^*], \dots, [\alpha^\ell] \cdot [i^{*\ell}] & \underline{\text{Subgroup Decision}} \\ \\ \approx_c & \underline{\alpha}, \dots, [\alpha^\ell], g_p \\ \\ \approx_c [\alpha], \dots, [\alpha^\ell], g_p g_q \\ \end{array}$

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A <u>valid</u> wire commitment from the prover is of the form:

$$\sigma_{\mathbf{w}} = [\phi(\alpha)] \cdot [\phi(i^*)] = [\phi(\alpha)] \cdot [w_{i^*}]$$

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 Use td* to project
$$\sigma_{w} \text{ onto subgroup } \mathbb{G}_{q}$$

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$$td^* = g_q: e(g_q, [\phi(\alpha)] \cdot [w_{i^*}]) = e(g_q, g_q)^{w_{i^*}}$$

$$CRS^* = [1] \cdot [1], [\alpha] \cdot [i^*], ..., [\alpha^{\ell}] \cdot [i^{*\ell}]$$

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$$\sigma_{w} \text{ onto subgroup } \mathbb{G}_{q}$$

Allow extraction of $w_{i^*} \in \{0, 1\}$

$$td^* = g_q: e(g_q, [\phi(\alpha)] \cdot [w_{i^*}]) = e(g_q, g_q)^{w_{i^*}}$$

Summary

- Extend [WW'22] to the polynomial setting
- Linear-size CRS, quasilinear prover time, black-box crypto
- Security from falsifiable assumptions

Open Problems:

Extend to prime-order groups?

Lattice-based constructions?

THANK YOU

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